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#2A-2/22/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF GENESEE, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NQ7 U^6 33 5 
COUNTY EMPLOYEES UNIT, LOCAL 819. CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. INC.. 
Charging Party. 
HARTER. SECREST & EMERY (BARRY R. WHITMAN. Esq.. and 
CHARLES D. CRAMTON. Esq.. of Counsel), for Respondent 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH (STEPHEN J. WILEY. Esq.. of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the County 
Employees Unit. Local 819. Civil Service Employees 
Association. Inc.. (CSEA) to a decision of an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge against the County of 
Genesee (County). In its charge, CSEA alleges that the 
County refused to negotiate with it in good faith in that it 
unilaterally discontinued a past practice of providing unit 
employees with County vehicles for transportation between 
home and work. The ALJ dismissed the charge on the basis of 
his determination that the County had satisfied its duty to 
Board - U-6335 -2 
negotiate in good faith before discontinuing the practice. 
All the material events took place between January 1, 
1981 and December 31. 1983, a time when the CSEA and the 
County were parties to a collective bargaining 
agreement.— During the fall of 1981, at the suggestion of 
members of its legislative body, the County proposed to 
discontinue its practice of making County vehicles available 
to unit employees for commuting to and from work. That 
2/ practice was not covered by the parties agreement.— 
Negotiations on this proposal ensued without agreement, and 
the dispute was submitted to mediation and fact-finding 
successively. 
On April 9, 1982, the fact finder recommended "the 
phasing in of a new practice whereby County-owned vehicles 
are made available only during work hours . . . ." This 
recommendation was rejected by CSEA. Thereafter, in 
i/The reason that the decision herein is issued so 
long after the material events transpired is that the 
parties jointly requested this Board not to issue a 
decision while another decision of this Board that is 
precedential for the issues before us was being appealed 
through the courts. This case was not ripe for decision 
until January 10, 1985. For further explanation, see 
footnote 5, infra. 
2/lf the provision of County vehicles to unit 
employees were covered by an existing agreement we would 
dismiss the charge on the ground that it merely involves 
our jurisdiction to enforce an agreement, which is 
something that we can not do. (§205.5 (d) of the Taylor 
Law.) 
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accordance with the procedure set forth in §209.3(e) of the 
Taylor Law, the County submitted the dispute to its 
legislative body for resolution and that legislative body 
adopted the recommendation of the fact finder. 
CSEA makes three arguments as to why the conduct of the 
County did not constitute good faith negotiations. 
First, it contends that the County waived any right it 
may have had to negotiate its proposal to eliminate the past 
practice of providing County vehicles for commuting 
purposes. According to CSEA, this waiver is a consequence of 
the County's contemplation of the change at the time when the 
1981-83 collective bargaining agreement was being negotiated. 
We find no merit to this argument. There is a Taylor 
Law duty to negotiate over mandatory subjects of 
3 / 
negotiation— not covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement unless there is an explicit and unambiguous 
waiver.— The record before us contains no evidence of any 
such waiver. 
—'The parties both a^rse that the issue in dispute 
between them is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
^New Paltz CSD, 11 PERB 1P057 (1978); CSEA and PEF 
v. Newman, 88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB IROll (3rd Dept. 1982). 
app. dism'd. 57 N.Y.2d 775. 15 PERB Y7020 (1982). 
!"' O'S 
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CSEA next contends that the impasse procedures set 
forth in §209.3(e) of the Taylor law. to wit, a determination 
by the Legislature of the government involved in the dispute, 
is not available to resolve negotiation deadlocks during the 
life of a collective bargaining agreement. We reject this 
argument as well. In City of Newburgh, 15 PERB 1[3116 (1982). 
we determined that the duty to negotiate during the life of 
an agreement carries with it the duty to submit to impasse 
5/ procedures.— The legislative determination is such an 
impasse procedure. 
Finally CSEA contends that even if a legislative 
determination would ordinarily be appropriate for the 
resolution of mid-contract negotiation disputes, such a 
resolution is inappropriate here because the County's 
proposal to terminate the past practice emanated from members 
of the County Legislature. This argument should be addressed 
to the State Legislature and not to this Board. It is clear 
that the State Legislature has made a conscious and deliberate 
decision that negotiation disputes such as this be resolved by a 
local legislative determination. This procedure was 
^/Our decision was affirmed by the Appellate Division, 
Third Department. City of Newburgh v. PERB. 97 A.D.2d 258, 
16 PERB ir7030 (3rd Dept. 1983) and, subsequently, by the Court 
of Apeals. 63 N.Y.2d 793. 17 PERB T7017 (1984). The decisions 
of the Courts did not reach the full scope of this Board's 
decision. It was the pendency of this matter before the 
Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals respectively that 
occasioned the joint request of the parties to delay 
consideration of this matter by the ALJ and this Board. 
954 
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originally recommendated by the Taylor Committee,— but 
that recommendation was not included in the Taylor Law when 
it was first enacted in 1967. However, the statute was 
amended in 1969 to provide for resolution of negotiation 
deadlocks by the legislative body of the government 
7/ involved.— Furthermore, in 1974, the State Legislature 
reconsidered its wisdom of providing for the resolution of 
deadlocks by local legislative bodies. The reason for that 
reconsideration was the same as CSEA's reason for its final 
contention, a concern that the local legislative body might 
not be sufficiently neutral to be entrusted with the 
responsibility of resolving deadlocks. Both houses passed a 
bill which eliminated the legislative determination as the 
8 / 
means of resolving any negotiation disputes.— The 
Legislature then recalled the bill, amended it and repassed 
it. The amendment restricted the elimination of legislative 
determinations to disputes involving school districts. The 
9/ . 
amended version of the bill became law.— This legislative 
history clearly demonstrates the applicability of the 
procedure set forth in §209.3(e) of the Taylor Law to the 
dispute before us. 
ii/Final Report of Governor's Committee on Public 
Employee Relations, page 46. 
1/L.1969. C.24, §6. 
I/A. 12476. 
9/L.1974. C.443. 
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NOW, THEREFORE. WE AFFIRM the decision of the ALJ and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 22. 198 5 
Albany, New York 
HaroldTTT Newman. Chai rman 
David C. Randies, Member 
5*"' 0.5'O'Tl 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CSEA. AFSCME UNIT-TOWN OF NORTH 
HEMPSTEAD and CSEA NASSAU LOCAL 830, 
Respondents. 
-and- CASE NO. U-7474 
KENNETH W. DEIBELE, 
Charging Party. 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH. P.C. (William M. 
Wallens. Esq., of Counsel), for Respondent 
KENNETH W. DEIBELE. pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Kenneth W. 
Deibele (Deibele) to the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) dismissing his charge against CSEA. AFSCME 
Unit-Town of North Hempstead and CSEA Nassau Local 830 
(CSEA). The charge alleged that CSEA breached its duty of 
fair representation in violation of §209-a.2 of the Act when 
a CSEA representative told him that he could not file a 
contract grievance when he requested CSEA to do so. 
Following Deibele's presentation of evidence, the ALJ granted 
CSEA's motion to dismiss. 
Deibele testified that he had been expelled from 
membership in CSEA in 1983; that approximately a year later, 
- 9547 
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he was sent home by the employer and docked a day's pay 
because he came to work wearing a tee shirt with a Teamster's 
logo. Deibele stated that he went to the president of the 
CSEA unit and told him that he wanted to file a grievance and 
that he was told that he could not file a grievance. 
Treating the conversation between Deibele and the CSEA 
president as a request that CSEA prosecute a grievance on his 
behalf, the ALJ dismissed the charge on the ground that 
Deibele produced no evidence that CSEA's action was grossly 
negligent or irresponsible or improperly motivated. The ALJ 
concluded that the applicable collective bargaining agreement 
supports the view that the employer had the right to 
determine the appropriateness of an employee's attire 
regardless of past practices. Accordingly, there was no 
basis for inferring that CSEA's action was not based on "a 
fair and reasonable judgment as to whether a particular 
complaint is meritorious or is otherwise worthy of 
prosecution by it as a grievance."— 
Deibele's exceptions do not address the ALJ's view of 
the charge alleged, her findings of fact, or conclusions of 
law. Rather, he appears to limit his exceptions to 
allegations of collusion between the Town and CSEA. However, 
there is no evidence in the record to support this theory. 
^/Nassau Educational Chapter of the Syosset Central School 
District Unit. CSEA. Inc.. 11 PERB 1P010, at 3020 (1978). 
55T ill 
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Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ•s dismissal of the charge. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge be. and hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 22.1985 
Albany, New York 
n. Chairman :> 
David C. Randies. ^ Member 
3^o 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 589. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF FIREFIGHTERS, 
Respondent, 
-aiid---- CASEI-N9T—U---7 7 69 
CITY OF NEWBURGH, 
Charging Party. 
CRAIN & RONES. P.C. (JOSEPH P. RONES. Esq., of 
Counsel), for Respondent. 
WILLIAM KAVANAUGH, Esq.. Corporation Counsel, for 
Charging Party 
) BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City of 
Newburgh (City) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) dismissing its charge against Local 589, International 
Association of Firefighters (Local 589). The charge alleges 
that Local 589 violated its duty to negotiate in good faith 
by filing a petition for compulsory interest arbitration of a 
matter that is not properly subject to interest arbitration.— 
FACTS 
Sometime in 1981, when the City and Local 589 were 
parties to a collective bargaining agreement, the City 
i^See our Rules of Procedure. 4 NYCRR §205.6. 
f ^ Board - U-7760 -2 
unilaterally reduced the number of fire fighters assigned to 
several shifts. The City also refused to negotiate the 
impact of that reduction. This occasioned an improper 
practice charge by Local 589 (U-5649). 
The charge was withdrawn on October 15, 1981, pursuant 
to the parties' stipulation obligating the City to negotiate 
the impact of the shift reduction. The stipulation indicated 
that one of the subjects of negotiation would be whether or 
not an impact situation exists, with both parties agreeing to 
exchange pertinent information bearing upon this question. 
Thereafter, Local 589 submitted information in support 
\ of its claim that the reduced manning levels increased the 
workload of the remaining employees as well as the likelihood 
of injury to them. It also demanded increased compensation 
in the form of higher pay, increased insurance benefits and 
increased shape-up time. 
The City did not respond either to Local 589's 
information or to its demands. Instead, it merely asserted 
that it was not persuaded that there had been any impact. 
Local 589 then declared an impasse and the Director of 
Conciliation of this Board assigned a mediator. Local 589 
also filed a charge against the City alleging a refusal to 
negotiate in good faith (U-5834). In turn, the City filed 
two charges against Local 589. one claiming that an impasse 
J had been declared prematurely (U-5870), and the second 
asserting that the existence of a collective bargaining 
9551! 
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agreement insulated it from submission to impasse procedures 
(U-6013). 
2/ 
We decided all three cases adversely to the City.— 
In that decision we held, among other things: 
_1._. That the statutory impasse procedures specified in 
§209 of the Taylor Law apply even during the life of a 
collective bargaining agreement if there is a statutory 
obligation to negotiate and the parties fail to reach an 
agreement. 
2. That the City was obligated to negotiate the impact 
of its unilateral action. In reaching this conclusion we 
resolved waiver arguments made by both parties against the 
City. The basis of our decision was the City's agreement, in 
settlement of Case No. U-5649, that it would negotiate the 
matter. 
3. That the City could not merely stand on its position 
that there was no impact. 
The City then filed a petition to review our decision. 
That petition was dismissed as untimely by the Supreme Court, 
Albany County, by judgment dated and entered April 8, 1983, 
in City of Newburgh v. Newman et al.. Albany County Index 
No. 2725-83. 
i/city of Newburgh. 15 PERB 1P116 (1982). 
-3 
tar 
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The City also filed a petition for a writ of prohibition 
preventing PERB from proceeding to impose mediation and 
interest arbitration in the dispute. The Supreme Court 
granted the writ on the ground that mediation and arbitration 
of interest disputes may only be provided in the course of 
3 / 
collective bargaining under the terms of a new contract.— 
On appeal, the judgment of the Supreme Court was 
4/ . . . 
reversed.— The Appellate Division held that PERB "has 
authority to appoint a mediator and to invoke arbitration 
proceedings during the life of the contract pursuant to §209 
of the Civil Service Law . . . . " It proceeded to say, 
however: "If in the course of negotiations, including 
mediation, which respondent has required . . . . arbitration 
is sought, means are available to challenge the imposition of 
arbitration (see 4 NYCRR §205.6)."-/ 
3/city of Newburgh v. PERB. 15 PERB T7029 (Sup. Ct. 
Alb. Co., 1982). 
i/city of Newburgh v. PERB 97 A.D.2d 258, 16 PERB 
ir7030 (3rd Dept. 1983). 
5/4 NYCRR §205.6 is §205.6 of the Rules of Procedure 
of this Board. It provides for objections to arbitrability 
which may include, but are not limited to the following 
circumstances: 
(l)a matter proposed is not a mandatory subject of 
negotiations; 
(2)a matter proposed was not the subject of 
negotiations prior to the petition; 
(3)a matter proposed had been resolved by agreement 
during the course of negotiations. 
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The obvious implication of the juxtaposition of these 
two sentences is that interest arbitration is available in 
principle for the resolution of contract negotiation 
disputes, but that the right to litigate defenses to the 
arbitration of specific demands is preserved by PERB's 
Rules. The Appellate Division also addressed the question of 
the duty to negotiate impact. It noted that the City had 
agreed that one of the subjects of negotiation would be 
whether or not an impact exists and said: "In this case, the 
question of impact resulting from petitioner's policy 
decision to reduce the shift manning levels of the firemen 
constitutes a mandatory subject of negotiation . . . ." 
The Appellate Division decision was affirmed by the 
6 / Court of Appeals— That decision was narrower than the 
decision of the Appellate Division. It merely held that 
prohibition did not lie against PERB because judicial avenues 
of review of the PERB decision had been available. It also 
cited with favor the language of the Appellate Division 
referring to challenges to arbitrability under 4 NYCRR §205.6. 
DISCUSSION 
The matter before us herein is a challenge to 
arbitrability made pursuant to 4 NYCRR §205.6. In support of 
its challenge the City makes four arguments: 
6/City of Newburqh v. PERB, 63 N.Y.2d 793, 17 PERB 
ir7017 (1984). 
3*" ^JOO^I 
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1. A petition for interest arbitration does not lie 
during the life of a collective bargaining agreement even if 
the subject matter of the petition otherwise is subject to 
compulsory negotiation. 
2. Local 589's impact demand is not subject to 
compulsory negotiations because there has been no 
demonstrated showing of any impact. 
3. Even if there had been a demonstrated impact, it 
would not be obligated to negotiate Local 589's demands 
because Local 589 had waived whatever right it may have had 
to such negotiations. 
4. Even if there had been a demonstrated impact, it 
would not be obligated to negotiate Local 589's demand 
because the impact demands were too vague. 
The first three arguments were made by the City in the 
prior cases before us. and rejected by us at 15 PERB 1f3116 
7/ • . . (1982).— The rejection herein of these arguments by the 
ALJ was based upon our earlier decision and we affirm it. In 
addition to the substantive reasons for rejecting the City's 
second and third arguments given in our prior decision and in 
that of the ALJ. we also determine that these claims of the 
City are barred by res judicata. 
—^Appeal dismissed as noted supra. 
-«•' *y<<jt$<L 
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The City argues that its primary claim, that arbitration 
is not available to resolve negotiation disputes during the 
life of a collective bargaining agreement, is not barred by 
res judicata. For this argument it relies upon Friedman v. 
State of New York, 24 N.Y.2d 528 (1969). In that case, a 
decision by the Court on Judiciary that it had jurisdiction 
over a matter was held not to be res judicata because there 
had been no means of appealing the decision of that Court, 
and because that Court's determination as to its jurisdiction 
was a mere legal conclusion not based on any litigated fact. 
Clearly, the first basis of that decision is inapplicable 
here. As to the second, we conclude that there was a factual 
basis for our earlier determination, that factual basis being 
our finding that the City had consented to negotiate the 
8 / 
impact of its unilateral action.— However, even if the 
claim herein were not barred by res judicata we would dismiss 
it based upon our reasoning in the City's earlier case and 
the opinion of the Appellate Division in review thereof. 
The City's final argument, that Local 589's demands were 
too vague to be submitted to interest arbitration, is 
properly before us under 4 NYCRR §205.6. However, we affirm 
8/Compare Eson v. PERB. 17 PERB ir7012 (Sup. Ct. Alb. 
Co., 1984). 
5*"1 <sJr<j!lJ\J 
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the decision of the ALJ dismissing this argument on the 
merits. Negotiation demands need not be drafted with the 
precision of a legal pleading. Local 589's proposal was that 
unit employees be compensated for their increased workload 
and exposure to injury. Moreover, in prior negotiations. 
Local 589 made it clear that such compensation should take 
the form of higher pay, increased insurance benefits and 
increased shape-up time. We find Local 589's demand 
sufficiently specific to be submitted to arbitration, it 
being understood that during the course of that adversarial 
proceeding the demands might be further refined. Further-
more, "[a]n arbitrator appointed pursuant to §209.4 of the 
Taylor Law may resolve language disputes just as he can 
9/ 
resolve disputes of substance."— 
NOW. THEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the ALJ 
and WE ORDER that the charge herein be, 
and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 22. 1985 
Albany. New York 
•^/white Plains Professional Fire Fighters 
Association, Local 274 IAFF. 11 PERB ^3 08 9, at 3146 (1978). 
#2D-2/22/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF UTICA, 
Respondent, 
-and-
JOHN E. CREEDON POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
ARMOND J. FESTINE, Esq.. Corporation Counsel, for 
Respondent 
ROCCO A. DE PERNO. ESQ.. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
On January 29, 1985. we dismissed the charge filed by 
John E. Creedon Police Benevolent Association (PBA) against 
the City of Utica (City). The matter came to us on the 
exceptions of the City to the decision of the Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the City had violated 
§209-a.l(e) of the Act. The PBA had filed no response to the 
City's exceptions. On February 4, 1985, we received a 
request from the attorney for the PBA that the PBA be 
CASE NO. U-7731 
r 9 
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permitted now to file a response to the exceptions filed by 
the City. 
In an affidavit, the PBA's attorney states that while he 
received a copy of a letter of transmittal of exceptions from 
the City, the only document included with that letter was a 
copy of a two-page letter previously sent to the ALJ as the 
City's "Brief" to him. The exceptions filed with this Board, 
however, consisted of a seven-page document, together with 23 
pages of exhibits. The PBA's attorney states that because he 
believed the City's exceptions consisted of nothing more than 
what had been previously submitted to the ALJ, "he didn't see 
any need to respond". 
The City has responded to the PBA's request and the 
Assistant Corporation Counsel representing the City states 
that he personally witnessed his secretary place a copy of 
the exceptions filed with this Board in an envelope addressed 
to the PBA attorney. He states that the exceptions mailed to 
the PBA attorney were the same exceptions mailed to the 
Board. He opposes the request that PBA now be allowed an 
opportunity to respond to the City's exceptions. 
An allegation of nonreceipt of a mailed paper as 
justification for not responding to it has recently been 
dealt with in Enqel v. Lichterman. 95 A.D.2d 536 (2nd Dept. 1983). 
aff'd. 62 N.Y.2d 943 (1984). It holds that when service is 
defined as the act of mailing, as it is by our Rules, a properly 
2T *><J?J«J 
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executed affidavit of service raises a presumption that a 
proper mailing occurred and that service was thereby-
effected. It is not sufficient for a party merely to assert 
that it did not receive the paper. Such party must raise a 
question of fact as to whether proper service was made. 
Failing that, the issue will be resolved in favor of the 
properly executed affidavit of service. 
The City accompanied its exceptions with a properly 
executed affidavit of service. The PBA has not raised any 
question as to the mailing of the exceptions. It has merely 
asserted that it did not receive the exceptions. There is, 
accordingly, no basis for granting the request of the PBA and 
it is hereby denied. 
DATED: February 22. 1985 
Albany, New York 
ma 
•Zf \- y w 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DELHI CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
and CASE NO. C^28 83 




DELAWARE ACADEMY AND CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
NON-TEACHING ASSOCIATION. CSEA. INC., LOCAL 
1000. AFSCME. 
Intervenor. 
[ _ ) 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Delaware Academy and Central 
School District Non-Teaching Association. CSEA. Inc.. Local 1000, 
AFSCME has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
' J employees of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
Certification - C-2883 page 2 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees employed in the titles of 
head custodian, assistant head 
custodian, custodial worker .custodian,, 
senior automotive mechanic, bus driver, 
automotive mechanic, cook, cafeteria 
worker/food service helper, school 
lunch manager, garage helper. 
Excluded: All other employees of the employer. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Delaware Academy and 
Central School District Non-Teaching Association. CSEA, Inc.. 
Local 1000. AFSCME and enter into a written agreement with such 
employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the above unit, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of. and administration of, grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: February 22. 1985 
Albany. New York 
&W-?H^A^^ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
David C. Randies} Memb 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF WYOMING and the SHERIFF OF 
WYOMING COUNTY, 
Joint Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2791 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
INC.. LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME. AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-2791 page 2 
Unit: Included: 
Excluded: 
All employees of the Sheriff's 
Department, including deputy sheriffs, 
sergeants, correction officers, senior 
correction officers, turnkeys, radio 
dispatchers, and fire dispatchers. 
Sheriff, undersheriff, administrative 
assistant, allr other coimty1 employeesr 
managerial employees, and confidential 
employees. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association. Inc., Local 1000. AFSCME, AFL-CIO and enter into a 
written agreement with such employee organization with regard to 
terms and conditions of employment of the employees in the above 
unit, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of. and administration of, 
grievances of such employees. 
DATED: February 22, 198 5 
Albany, New York 
- ^ 4jn*Ci2>^^^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randies, Member 
mi 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF CHILI 
Employer. 
and CASE NO. e^-2788 
FRANK MOBILIO. et al.. 
Petitioner, 
-and-
LOCAL 3179. AFSCME. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 3179. AFSCME has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
*3!tFi^  
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Unit: Included: All full-time and regular part-time 
employees who work at least twenty 
hours per week. 
Excluded: Supervisor, Highway Superintendent, 
Town Clerk, Budget Officer, Secretary 
to Supervisor, Assessor. Director of 
; Recrecrtioin seasonaland library 
employees. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Local 3179, AFSCME and 
enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment of the 
employees in the above unit, and shall negotiate collectively 
with such employee organization in the determination of, and 
administration of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: February 22, 1985 
Albany. New York 
r ^ H ^ - ^ ^ L ^ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
David C. Randles.\Member/ 
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